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1 Introduction
This article argues that Mozambique satisfies the
three criteria that define ‘turnaround’: a durable
cessation of violent conflict, sustained economic
growth and sustained improvements in human
development indicators. What explains, contributes
to and sustains Mozambique’s turnaround is the
implementation of relatively successful 
? economic reforms: structural adjustment
programme, privatisation, financial sector reform,
investment promotion, sound macroeconomic
management, exchange, trade and price reforms
and public expenditure adjustment; and 
? political reforms: the approval of the 1990
constitution that enshrined liberal and multi-party
democracy, the 1992 Rome peace agreement,
the repatriation and resettlement of millions of
refugees, multi-party democratic elections,
democratisation and public sector reforms. 
Each of the economic and political reforms has been
implemented to address the causes and
consequences of civil war and the problems of
promoting development and the re-legitimisation of
the Mozambican state. The relatively successful
implementation of economic and political reforms
yielded macroeconomic and political stability which,
in turn, contributed to large flows of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and investors’ confidence in
Mozambique’s capacity to sustain its turnaround.
Despite the outstanding economic and political
performance, Mozambique’s long-term
macroeconomic and political stability are threatened
by allegations of increased levels of corruption in
government institutions, the fragility of the multi-
party system, a high dependence on foreign aid, and
a deficient national taxation system. To what extent
over the longer term can a country sustain poverty-
reducing economic growth, rising exports and
macroeconomic stability in the context of high
dependence on aid, a possible decline in aid and
deficient national taxation strategies?
2 Background
In the wake of the 1992 Rome peace agreement,
Mozambique has gone through political and
economic restructuring, moving rapidly from a 16-
year civil war and one-party autocracy to multi-party
democracy. It has also pressed forward with the
liberalisation of the economy, foreign trade, and the
privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Improved
financial discipline has resulted in inflation falling from
high levels in the 1990s to 6 per cent in 2003. Apart
from privatisations, market-driven exchange and
interest rates, and full convertibility of the national
currency, the establishment of a stock exchange and
other financial sector reforms demonstrate
Mozambique’s orientation towards private sector-led
economic growth and stability. Annual gross domestic
product (GDP) growth averaged 5.5 per cent
between 1987 and 1996, and 11 per cent annually
between 1996 and 1999. Much of this impressive
performance resulted from foreign aid. From 1987
onwards, Mozambique received US$ 8billion in
foreign aid, equivalent to US$ 600million, annually.
More than 50 per cent of government spending and
75 per cent of public investment have been financed
by foreign aid (World Bank 2000: 2–6).
Mozambique’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP) for 2001–5, which sets out a commitment to
reduce poverty to 50 per cent of the population by
2010, observes that Mozambique needs to attain
sustained annual growth rates in GDP of 8 per cent,
over the next six years. In addition to the PRSP, the
government has developed a long-term
development blueprint, Agenda 2025: Vision and
Strategy of the Nation, for dealing with absolute
poverty and socio-economic development over the
next two decades. However the HIV/AIDS pandemic
threatens to reverse all these gains. Approximately
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14.5 per cent of the population is HIV-infected and
HIV/AIDS is having a devastating impact on
institutions and the people, and compromises the
country’s ability to achieve sustainable development
over the longer term.
Mozambique’s presidential and parliamentary
elections of 1994 and 1999 took place peacefully,
although some opposition political parties have
questioned the fairness of the electoral process. The
ruling Frelimo party won the majority of seats in
parliament, and its candidate for the presidency won
the post. The third presidential and parliamentary
elections occurred on 1 and 2 December 2004, in
which the Frelimo party and its candidate for the
presidency – Mr Armando Emílio Guebuza – had a
landslide victory.
Democratic decentralisation was introduced in 1998,
with the first-ever local elections in 33 municipalities
(most of which are mainly rural). The aims were to
give decision-making powers and responsibility to
people who have a legitimate stake in and
knowledge of local development needs; to increase
community participation in local governance and
local economic development; and to increase the
speed and flexibility of decision making while
generating additional resources and encouraging
more efficient and effective use of existing ones. It
was also intended to spread the gains of
democratisation to local contexts; and to improve
the effectiveness of the central government by
providing a check on its performance and curbing
antagonisms between central and local institutions.
The second local elections were held successfully in
November 2003 in which five of the 33
municipalities passed peacefully to the Renamo-led
opposition (including the second largest city of
Mozambique, Beira). The results of this
municipalisation process have thus far been – with
some variations – positive: improvements in service
delivery, the management of local affairs, community
participation, revenue collection, accountability and
transparency (Kulipossa 2004a).
All of these changes have established a framework
for governance and administration based on
democratic principles: representation, political
equality, limitations on state power and extended
political participation. This has contributed to
Mozambique’s ‘turnaround’: a durable cessation of
violent conflict, sustained economic growth, and
sustained improvements in human development
indicators (see Table 1).
This study attempts to outline how Mozambique
achieved ‘turnaround’ by first providing a background
to why Mozambique became a poor performer and
experienced violent conflict and second, discussing
and explaining the factors contributing to and
sustaining Mozambique’s turnaround. It is argued that
Mozambique implemented each of the economic
and political reforms to address the consequences of
civil war and its internal causes and the problems of
promoting development and the re-legitimisation of
the Mozambican state. The sequencing of reforms
was predicated on the assumption that achieving
sustainable development requires an appropriate
interaction between economic and political reforms,
starting from those perceived to be relatively easy
before implementing the most difficult ones. Hence,
Mozambique first addressed economic reforms in
preparation for more difficult political reforms.
3 Why Mozambique experienced violent conflict
Mozambique was embroiled in a civil war for 16
years. Two main political forces were involved in the
war: the Front for Liberation of Mozambique
(Frelimo) and the Mozambican National Resistance
(Renamo).
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The causes of the civil war are not
officially known but a common semi-official
explanation is a combination of internal and external
causes. However there is no consensus as to what
these causes were. This is because different social
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Table 1 Mozambique's economic growth rates and human development indices
Average real economic growth rate (1993–2001) Human development index
1990 1995 2000 2002
8.2 0.310 0.318 0.342 0.354
Source Derived from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the UNDP's Human Development
Reports for the selected years.
groups and academics have put forward competing
explanations of the causes of war (O’Laughlin 2000:
29–42). For some people, the internal causes that led
to civil war include power struggles over access to
and the distribution of resources, monopolisation of
political power and the corresponding weakness and
fragmentation of broad-based political networks,
marginalisation of representatives of the traditional
African structures of governance, the collectivisation
of agricultural development, the militarisation of the
society, Frelimo’s imposition of a fixed
Marxist–Leninist political system, and the
exacerbation of already entrenched tensions
between regions and communities.
The external causes relate to the fact that the
proclamation of Mozambique’s independence in 1975
and its commitment to building a new society based
on equality and social justice for all citizens had
antagonised the then racial and minority regimes in
South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).
Mozambique’s support to the African National
Congress (ANC) of South Africa and to the ZANU
and ZAPU liberation movements of Zimbabwe,
coupled with its firm stand against apartheid and
oppression in Southern Africa, also contributed to
the climate of confrontation and enmity with both
regimes. Therefore, Rhodesian and South African
secret services set up Renamo, financed and trained
it in order to destabilise Mozambique and undermine
the fulfilment of its political and economic agenda
through low-intensity guerrilla warfare. In addition,
Mozambique’s close relations with the Non-Aligned
Movement and the former Communist bloc made it
a Cold War battleground.
It should be noted that although the Rhodesian and
South African secret services created and supported
Renamo in its struggle against Frelimo, it has been
internally supported by Frelimo’s dissidents,
Renamo’s captives, and local populations in Renamo’s
controlled areas. But how did all this happen? What
led to this devastating war?
According to Luís Benjamin Serapião, the
Mozambican civil war was triggered by systematic
purges of military commanders, including those who
had taken part in the struggle for independence, and
other Frelimo cadres suspected of not agreeing with
the Marxist–Leninist ideology. In May 1975, 5,000
former Frelimo members were considered traitors;
in August of the same year, various top army
commanders were expelled and sent to prisons or
re-education camps; in December 1975, the
government successfully cracked down on a rebellion
and ‘those involved in it were severely punished’; and
in February 1976, five members of Frelimo’s Central
Committee were also expelled from the party
(Serapião 1989: 11–12). Among the top military
commanders expelled were André Matadi
Matsangaisa – the first president of Renamo – and
Afonso Marceta Dhlakama – the current president
of Renamo. Both had escaped from a re-education
camp and then went to Rhodesia where they
received logistical support and assistance to fight
against Frelimo. In June 1976, the Rhodesians set up
the ‘Voice of Free Africa’, a radio station aimed at
broadcasting anti-Frelimo propaganda. In February
1977, André Matsangaisa, Afonso Dhlakama and
other Frelimo’s dissidents returned to Mozambique
through Manica province to fight against the Frelimo
government.
Already in Manica province, a small group of
Renamo’s fighters mounted a successful raid against
a re-education camp, freeing 500 detainees. Of
these, 300 detainees were incorporated into
Renamo’s ranks. Apart from targeting re-education
camps where most Frelimo dissidents were sent,
Renamo fighters adopted outrageous methods of
kidnapping, ambushes, threats, destruction of villages
and farms of local populations, sabotage and
mutilation to force people to adhere to Renamo’s
objectives, increase the number of guerrillas, and
widen its base of support inside Mozambique, as
reported in a range of studies on the subject.
2
This explains the overwhelming increase in the
number of fighters and the pace at which the war
was spread throughout Mozambique. According to
Serapião, the number of Renamo fighters increased
steadily from 917 in 1978 to 4,500 in 1979; from
10,000 in 1980 to 25,000 in 1989; and another
3,000 fighters were in training camps. Similarly,
while until 1981 the war was limited to Manica
Province, in 1982 it spread to four provinces: Tete,
Sofala, Inhambane and Gaza; in 1983, the war was
expanded to three more provinces: Maputo,
Zambézia, and Nampula; and in 1984, it had reached
the provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado (Serapião
1989: 12–13).
By the middle of the 1980s, Mozambique was at a
crossroads, as the war had spread throughout the
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country, causing great devastation in rural areas, the
suspension of development programmes and the
disruption of the socio-economic infrastructure
(Hanlon 1996: 15–16). As a result:
? one million people died
? 1.7 million people were refugees in neighbouring
countries
? 3.2 million people were displaced inside
Mozambique
? US$ 20billion were lost
? many schools, hospitals and health facilities were
destroyed
? teachers, students, nurses and patients were
killed or kidnapped
? transport infrastructure was disrupted
? buses and trains with passengers were burned
alive
? more than 3,000 rural shops were closed or
destroyed.
Because of this devastation of social and economic
infrastructure, Mozambique became the poorest,
most aid-dependent, and debt-ridden country in the
world, thus ranking low in the human development
index when compared with other Southern African
countries (UNDP 1998; Devereux and Palmero 1999:
7). There was also a steady decline in GDP,
production, real incomes, employment, a negative
balance of payments and an average per capita
income of less than US$100 (EIU 1994–5, 1995).
Faced with severe shortages of food supplies and
the need to restore the socio-economic life in rural
areas, the Frelimo government agreed to join the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in 1984 and allowed the presence of
international non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) to distribute aid and food for the starving
rural masses. By 1986, Mozambique agreed to pursue
a structural adjustment programme (SAP) in return
for aid.
The concessions made by Mozambique to Western
countries had positive pay-offs. Aid increased from
US$ 360million in 1985 to US$ 1billion in 1990. In the
1990–4 period, Mozambique was the largest aid
recipient in sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for more
than US$ 1.1billion per year: 200 million in debt
relief; 100 million in food and emergency aid; and
800 million for other kinds of assistance (Hanlon
1996: 16–17). The consequence of the proliferation of
aid was that donors and international NGOs became
powerful, often bypassing the Mozambican
government in policy making and implementation.
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4 The sequencing of the reforms and its
rationale
The economic and political reforms have been
carefully sequenced in order to address the
consequences of civil war and its internal causes and
the problems of promoting development and the re-
legitimisation of the Mozambican state, to reconcile
and accommodate Frelimo’s and Renamo’s interests
within the political system, to democratise the
country, and to consolidate and sustain socio-political
and economic development. The sequencing of
reforms was predicated on the assumption that
achieving sustainable development requires an
appropriate interaction between economic and
political reforms, starting with those perceived to be
relatively easy to implement and then moving on to
the most difficult ones. The strategy was to
implement certain reforms on which other reforms
could be built. Thus they first implemented ‘zero-
generation’ reforms, made them work, and then
implemented other reforms in an incremental way.
So Mozambique first undertook an initial round of
economic reforms, in preparation for the more
difficult processes of peace negotiations and more
challenging political and economic reforms.
Achieving macroeconomic stability and restoring high
economic growth could create the conditions for
sustaining the costs of war (if the climate was not
ripe for political negotiations), feeding internally
displaced people due to violence, attracting FDI, and
paving the way for the implementation of other
economic and political reforms.
Economic reforms were followed by political reforms,
starting with the approval of the 1990 constitution
that enshrined liberal and multi-party democracy,
then by peace negotiations that led to the 1992
Rome peace agreement, the demobilisation of
Frelimo and Renamo soldiers, the repatriation of
millions of refugees who were living in neighbouring
countries, and the democratisation of the
Mozambican society through multi-party elections
and public sector reforms. Therefore, decentralisation
and other public sector reforms have been
implemented to fulfil democratic principles, to widen
broad-based political networks, and to respond to
the inability of the over-centralised, top-down
system of governance to satisfy the needs of local
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communities across Mozambique. The leadership has
shown a strong commitment to implementing
reforms, and it has had relatively capable technocrats
to spearhead the reform process, with the support
and technical advice from donors.
5 The implementation of the structural
adjustment programme and economic recovery
In response to the national economic collapse and
evolving international context, in 1987 the
Mozambican government launched a SAP in order to
reverse the decline in production by creating better
conditions for rural populations, ensuring a minimum
level of consumption and income, reducing domestic
financial imbalances, strengthening the balance of
payments, and laying the foundation for economic
growth (GOM 1987). The implementation of the SAP
entailed two main stages: stabilisation and
adjustment. The first stage aimed at the devaluation
of the national currency and drastically cutting public
expenditures. The second entailed the transformation
of economic structures through deregulation,
privatisation, reduction of bureaucracies and
subsidies, and the encouragement of realistic prices
in order to stimulate high productivity.
Although the SAP accelerated inflation, hardships
and deprivations for the majority of the population
in the first years of its implementation, its benefits
started to be felt in the following years, with
substantial growth in the agricultural and industrial
sectors. To mitigate the negative effects of the SAP,
the government implemented ‘zero-generation’
reforms aimed at placating the majority of people
who had suffered most from the civil war. The
introduction of social safety net programmes, such as
the Demobilization Fund for Frelimo’s and Renamo’s
re-trenched soldiers, a Food and Subsidy Scheme, a
Social Fund for Medicines, an Infant Food
Supplement, a School Social Action Fund, a School
Lunch Programme, a Civil Servant Wage
Supplement and an Emergency Programme, were
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Table 2 Origin of the growth of the Mozambican GDP, 1996–2001 (%)
Economic sectors 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agriculture 30.5 30.2 27.2 25.4 20.2 18.8
Fishing 4.0 3.9 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.9
Industry 16.0 17.4 21.5 21.8 22.7 24.8
Mining 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3
Manufacturing 8.7 9.6 11.0 11.0 11.3 10.7
Electricity and water 0.5 0.8 1.9 3.0 2.4 2.1
Construction 6.6 6.7 8.3 7.7 8.7 11.7
Services 49.5 48.5 48.3 50.3 55.1 54.4
Commerce 23.2 22.5 21.5 21.1 20.3 17.2
Repair services 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7
Restaurants and hotels 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.1
Transport and communication 8.6 8.9 9.2 10.2 12.6 16.0
Financial services 3.7 3.2 2.6 2.1 4.0 4.3
Real estate rentals 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.2 1.9 4.6
Corporate services 1.3 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.7
Government services 4.4 4.5 5.1 6.8 7.1 7.1
Other services 4.1 3.7 4.3 5.1 6.0 5.6
Source IMF Mozambique Country Report No. 02/139 (July 2002).
part of the ‘zero-generation’ reform package. The
SAP proved relatively successful in halting the
economic stagnation and in boosting rapid economic
growth, despite the criticisms leveled by some
scholars against the Bretton Woods institutions
(Hanlon 1996).
Since the mid-1990s, Mozambique has had rapid
growth. Much of it derived from mega-projects,
such as the Mozambique aluminum project (Mozal),
which have contributed to exports, although
generating few jobs (Anderson 2001). Table 2
provides an overview of the origin of growth of
GDP from 1996 to 2001.
As is clear from Table 2, Mozambique’s steady
economic growth has been driven by the
construction sector whose share of GDP increased
from 6.6 per cent in 1996 to 11.7 per cent in 2001.
This increase is explained by benefits received from
the investment phase of the Mozal mega-project.
Growth in the agricultural sector has been
decelerating since 1996 from 30.5 per cent to 18.8
per cent in 2001, and it is the most crucial sector of
the Mozambican economy. The manufacturing sector
has had a constant average share of GDP of about
10 per cent since 1996; the services sector has
provided a remarkable share of GDP, rising from 49.5
per cent in 1996 to 54.4 per cent in 2001. In the
same period, the private sector investments
accounted for 2–3 per cent of GDP (Biggs et al.
1999). The low contribution of the private sector to
GDP is attributed to: (1) unfavourable conditions
under which it operates: burdensome regulations
imposed by public institutions which in turn lead to
high costs of local production and its inability to
compete with foreign products, and (2) problems
faced by private sector firms in accessing external
sources of credit or working capital.
It should be stressed, however, that Mozambique’s
economic growth has been supported by substantial
FDI. The government has been pursuing a zealous
strategy to attract large-scale FDI by privatising and
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Table 3 The sources of Mozambique's exports, 1997–2001 (US$ millions)
Product groups 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Fish 84.4 66.4 74.8 100.7 102.2
Prawns 74.9 57.4 64.6 91.2 82.2
Agriculture (excluding Fishery) 102.9 88.8 87.0 83.4 66.3
Wood 10.1 5.2 9.2 14.6 12.6
Textiles and clothing 10.0 10.0 5.8 6.7 14.1
Rubber products 0.7 3.6 1.1 0.3 4.8
Footwear 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.3
Mineral and Fuel 3.8 1.1 7.8 11.0 6.2
Machinery 5.3 13.0 6.6 4.7 6.5
Transportation equipment 4.2 3.7 5.9 5.0 5.8
Miscellaneous 7.3 15.1 8.9 10.8 10.7
Sub-total 229.6 207.6 208.0 237.8 229.5
Aluminium 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.2 473.4
Sub-total (with Aluminium) 229.6 229.6 208.0 298.0 702.9
Electricity 0.0 37.0 62.8 67.0 70.0
Total 229.6 244.6 270.9 364.9 772.9
Source Nathan Associates (2002).
restructuring over 1,200 companies, pursuing
financial sector reform, and promoting investments,
sound macroeconomic management, exchange,
trade, and price reforms, and public expenditure
(World Bank 2000: 5) in order to boost economic
development, improve its trade balance, raise
manufacturing outputs, and increase government
revenues. It is also expected that a pipeline mega-
project approved by the government will provide
more than US$ 7billion of investment (Nasir et al.
2003: 10–11).
Mozambique has been attracting considerable
interest among foreign investors due to its abundant
natural resources, advantageous location along
important transportation corridors, political and
macroeconomic stability, inexpensive labour, an
increasingly liberal trade regime, and cautious
exchange rate management. In recent years,
Mozambique has also been an attractive destination
of some regional investors such as South Africans
and Mauritians. Taken together, these factors have
been contributing to investors’ confidence in
Mozambique’s capacity to sustain its ‘turnaround’
(World Bank 2000: 4–8). The main bilateral creditors
of Mozambique are France, Russia, Italy, Brazil,
Germany, Portugal and the UK. Mozambique’s main
multilateral creditors include the World Bank, the
IMF and the African Development Bank. Its good
economic performance can also be illustrated by its
exports which have been rising since 1997 (Table 3).
Table 3 shows a substantial increase in exports in all
product groups. However leaving aside aluminium
and electricity, Mozambique’s exports have remained
unchanged in the past five years and this may have
negative impacts for poverty reduction. As already
mentioned, much of Mozambique’s economic
growth has been driven by mega-projects but these
have limited employment effects. As Nasir et al.
(2003: 13) point out, economic growth oriented to
poverty reduction requires labour-intensive
manufactured exports as well as the establishment
of strong linkages between mega-projects and local
producers. Another major concern is Mozambique’s
high dependence on foreign aid. Its rapid economic
growth and the rise in exports owe much to large
inflows of foreign aid. This may have negative long-
term implications for the sustainability of economic
growth and exports, as foreign aid is expected to
decline in the next few years. To what extent can a
country sustain its rapid economic growth, rising
exports and macroeconomic stability in the context
of declining foreign aid and deficient national
taxation?
6 Peace negotiations and democratisation of the
Mozambican society
Following earlier negotiations between the Frelimo
government and Renamo, a peace settlement was
achieved on 4 October 1992 in Rome. The peace
agreement was reached due to the recognition by
the warring parties that the civil war could not be
won by military means. Technically, the war could
have continued for a long period because both
Frelimo and Renamo had enough military equipment
and means to proceed with the fighting and
destruction of the country; and they were supported
by foreign countries.
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However, politically and
socially, the continuation of war was undermining
the legitimacy of both contending parties because of
the magnitude of devastation, killings and the
suffering of innocent civilians across the country.
Legitimacy impinges directly on the exercise of
political power and a government or a rebel
movement that lacks it has serious problems with
governability. What governments or rebel
movements can get the people to do depends not
only on the resources they command (military
means) but also on their legitimacy and the quality of
cooperation they get from their people or
subordinates (Beetham 1993: 488). A government
which is able to acquire legitimacy and get support
from its citizens can achieve its objectives effectively.
In the absence of legitimacy, the powerful can only
secure compliance by resorting to coercion, terror,
violence and force. However these means of
compliance are difficult to sustain over time. Reliance
on non-legitimate means of compliance can lead to
disorder, instability and ineffectiveness, which are
serious threats to the authority of the powerful and
to economic performance. Legitimacy generates
moral grounds for compliance which in turn leads
subordinates to develop a particular quality of
compliance which enhances the order, stability, and
effectiveness of a system of power (Beetham 1991:
34). This is why the powerful seek legitimacy.
Aware of the need to end the war and secure
legitimacy from the Mozambican people, both
Frelimo and Renamo pursued peace negotiations.
This helps us to understand Renamo’s 16-point
document distributed to the media in Nairobi and
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Washington in August 1989, after its first congress
held in Gorongosa between 5 and 9 June 1989.
There were also internal pressures on both sides,
especially from Catholic Bishops through their 1987
Pastoral Letter, to seek peace (Serapião 1989: 14, 21).
At the regional level, Mozambique’s neighbours –
especially Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe –
were undergoing democratic changes. In South
Africa, apartheid laws were being dismantled and
the country was adopting democratic changes that
led to the 1994 multiracial elections.
At the international level, donors were concerned
about the resolution of conflicts plaguing Africa.
They could no longer tolerate the continuation of
vicious circles of war and violence. The experience
and coordination gained by bilateral and multilateral
donors in the course of the implementation of
liberalisation programmes were extended to
discussions of political and security matters. This was
a reflection of the international consensus-building
on African economic and political issues (Alden 2001:
xvi). Hence, they put pressure on contending parties
to seek a peace settlement. Apart from these shifts,
good governance and democratisation had emerged
as their top priorities. Both Frelimo and Renamo
embarked on peace negotiations because they knew
that the civil war in Mozambique could only be
continued at their own peril.
It is for these reasons that the civil war in
Mozambique had no winner or loser. Neither
Frelimo nor Renamo was militarily annihilated. The
most important winner were the Mozambican
people, including former soldiers of both Frelimo
and Renamo, who had suffered greatly from the civil
war. The solution was to introduce fundamental
economic and political reforms to reconcile and
accommodate Frelimo’s and Renamo’s interests
within the Mozambican political system, and then to
implement ‘zero-generation’ reforms aimed at
placating the majority of the people who had
suffered most from the civil war. This helps to explain
the durable cessation of violent conflict in
Mozambique.
Another contributing factor to the durable cessation
of conflict was the astute mediation of members of
the Catholic Community of Sant Egidio, the Italian
government and the Catholic Archbishop of Beira, in
a process that entailed the building of mutual
confidence between the Frelimo government and
Renamo and the creation of democratic institutions
(Hansma 1993; Hume 1994). The peace agreement
was a detailed blueprint for truce, demobilisation of
armed forces, de-mining and reopening of roads to
facilitate the resettlement of a huge number of
refugees and other displaced people, humanitarian
issues and democratic elections. The implementation
of the agreement led to the first-ever general and
presidential elections in 1994, and the subsequent
general and presidential elections in 1999 and in
2004. All of this explains why Mozambique’s
turnaround has been succeeding and is sustainable.
7 Public sector reforms
7.1 Decentralisation: devolution and
deconcentration
Devolution
In 1997, the Mozambican parliament passed Law 2/97,
on municipalities, opening the way to the devolution
of political and economic powers onto local
institutions. As a result, on 30 June 1998 municipal
assemblies, local councils, mayors, and local
parliamentarians were elected. These bodies were
vested with the power of making laws, planning and
budgeting, acquiring and administering resources and
taxing. In the exercise of their powers, municipal
institutions are encouraged to coordinate their
activities with traditional authorities in order to
satisfy specific needs of local communities.
By devolving these functions and responsibilities, the
central government aims to enable them to provide
public services through local accountability and to
empower people hitherto marginalised by increasing
their participation in local political and socio-
economic development. Local governments are
expected to produce equitable services and goods
through better use of local resources and
knowledge. Thus far, however, progress has been
hampered by a lack of clarity in the legal framework
and a severe shortage of resources at the municipal
level – although municipalities produce almost two-
thirds of Mozambique’s GDP, they receive only one
per cent of the budget.
The devolution of political and economic powers is
to be pursued gradually, and it is expected that the
process will last as long as 100 years.
Deconcentration
In parallel with devolution, the Mozambican
parliament passed Law 8/2003 on local state bodies:
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provinces, districts, administrative posts and localities.
Through this law, the central state will deconcentrate
to those levels certain functions and responsibilities
in the areas of service provision, investments,
planning and budgeting through upward
accountability. The law reaffirms the continuation of
a centralist principle of public administration and has
thus far done little to change the ‘very top-down,
silo-nature of the system and extreme lack of
resources and horizontal planning that is still the
current reality’.
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Nevertheless, it has three important
innovations which promise greater deconcentration
and give some slight recognition to some principles
of democratic governance such as transparency,
responsiveness and participation (Kulipossa 2004b).
These features are:
1. A multisectoral and integrated approach to
district administration, which weakens the
principle of double subordination. District
administrators (DAs) will be assisted by permanent
secretaries and district service directors and
together will make up district governments (DGs).
The representatives of line ministries at the
district level (district directors of agriculture,
health, education and others) will have a
technical/advisory role to DGs.
2. District consultative councils, of which DGs are
part, will have an advisory/consultative role to
DGs. This body will not be elected, and DAs and
DGs will not be accountable to it. However it will
have a certain degree of ‘representativeness’,
since it will include traditional authorities,
community and religious leaders and economic,
social and professional associations. This is clear in
Decree 15/2000 on interactions between
traditional authorities (or community leaders) and
local state organs. By-law 107-A/2000 regulates
the functions, competencies, and benefits of
traditional authorities. Administrative posts will
have their respective consultative councils.
3. Districts will be budgetary units and their own
funds, consisting of locally collected revenues and
transfers from the central government; and they
will be obliged to formulate district development
plans. However their discretionary powers
concerning the financial regime, budget
execution, downward accountability and
community participation still remain limited.
Both devolution and deconcentration of political and
economic powers have been implemented to
address the problems of overcentralisation and the
monopolisation of political and economic powers.
7.2 Broader public sector reforms: 2001–11
In 2001, the government of Mozambique passed its
Global Strategy for the Public Sector Reform (PSR)
aimed at enabling the public sector to promote
socio-economic development and reduce absolute
poverty. The rationalisation and decentralisation of
service delivery is one of the key components of the
reform, and it entails the restructuring of the public
sector based on functional analyses and restructuring
plans for all ministries. The restructuring will lead to
the transformation of the functions, structures and
human resources of the central government in
connection with policy formulation and monitoring.
Service delivery will be transferred from central
institutions to local level institutions, including the
private sector and civil society organisations (CSOs).
The PSR focuses on six key areas: 
? improving service delivery through
decentralisation and institutional restructuring
? strengthening the policy formulation and
monitoring process
? enhancing professionalism in the public sector
? improving financial management and
accountability
? promoting good governance and combating
corruption, and
? management of the reform process.
The implementation of these public sector reforms
is reflected in a set of detailed annual work plans for
different reform areas. Thus, the PSR is seen as a key
instrument for operationalising the government’s
objectives of poverty reduction. Although progress
has been uneven across ministries and specific
sectors, preliminary evaluations of the
implementation of the PSR are cautiously positive
(Technical Review Team 2004: 7–8).
8 Poverty reduction strategies, 1995–2025
Although the requirement for the Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) to have PRSPs was introduced
in late 1999 by the World Bank and the IMF (IDS
2000), Mozambique has had its own programme
aimed at promoting socio-economic development and
fighting against absolute poverty before the end of the
civil war. The two decades of civil strife and economic
stagnation had prompted the government to set up
these development strategies as key priorities.
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As a result of the first national household survey on
living conditions in Mozambique, carried out
between 1995 and 1996 (MPF et al. 1998), the
government formulated the PRSP, which had three
main objectives: (1) improvement of rural livelihoods;
(2) investment in human capital and (3) building a
disaster safety net (MPF 1995: 1). The second anti-
poverty document was set out in the 1999 Poverty
Reduction Action Plan, aimed at rebuilding physical
infrastructure (roads, schools and hospitals), which
address the basic needs of communities. These two
policy documents were followed by three other
anti-poverty-related documents which guided the
government in the struggle against absolute poverty:
A View into the Future (1998), Policy Framework Paper
(1999–2000) and Second Five-Year Plan (2000–2004)
(Devereux and Palmero 1999: 13–17).
Along with these initiatives, the government
approved in 1997 a new land law, which entailed
extensive popular debate and participation. In 2001,
the government published its most comprehensive
anti-poverty policy strategy: the Action Plan for the
Reduction of Absolute Poverty (2001–2005) (PARPA)
(GOM 2001), implemented through the annual
economic and social plan and the state budget. In
2003, the government published Agenda 2025 for
fostering socio-economic development. In these
policy documents, the government maps out its
strategies for poverty reduction and socio-economic
development in the short, medium, and long term.
Mozambique’s PRSP focuses on enhanced
expenditure programmes (education, health, road
construction/rehabilitation), institutional reforms to
improve governance (decentralisation, public sector
reforms and civil service reform) and structural
reforms (efficient financial management, tax reform
and land reform).
The government has been working with the World
Bank and the IMF in order to set out the policy
framework within which resources freed up by debt
relief in the context of the HIPC initiative are
invested in key development sectors: education,
health, infrastructure, agriculture and rural
development, governance, security and judicial
system, public sector reforms, etc. These have been
seen as the most pro-poor priority areas for poverty
reduction.
Preliminary assessments of the effectiveness of
government anti-poverty strategies are cautiously
positive. Achievements of physical and financial
targets of PARPA and other programmed actions
are said to be moving in the right direction,
especially for the education, health, good
governance and legal/justice sectors. According to
the IMF (2003: 45) these sectors ‘are performing
well’.
9 The interaction between the Mozambican
government and donors
The devastation wrought by the civil war could not
have been countered if it were not for the active
support of donors. In fact, the Rome peace
agreement was a result of political will of the
government and Renamo and of the readiness of
donors to support its implementation and their
commitment to large-scale financial support for
elections and reconstruction. The successful
implementation of the peace agreement was a
result of a positive interaction between the
government and donors. Bilateral and multilateral
donors, through the United Nations Operation in
Mozambique (ONUMOZ), played a pivotal role in
ensuring the success of pacification, democratisation,
national reconstruction and the introduction of
other economic and political reforms.
Whereas in the 1990s government–donor
interactions were characterised by competition,
duplication, stringent conditions, bypassing
government institutions and creating parallel
structures, at present their relationships are now
based on sector-wide approaches (SWAps),
partnership, ownership, accountability and
transparency. Under the new aid principles (IDS 1998,
2001) donors are involved in Mozambique’s political
and economic processes through dialogue and
participatory monitoring and evaluation on key policy
issues and in the design and implementation of
development programmes, while leaving leadership
and ownership matters in the hands of Mozambican
authorities.
Under SWAps, donor resources flow through pooled
accounts and are managed through government
procedures and systems. This enables the
government to incorporate all funding for each
sector into the national budget, and gives it greater
freedom to design and implement programmes and
allocate resources to better achieve intended results.
SWAps also enable the Mozambican government to
reduce transaction costs that the engagement with
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multiple donors entail by setting up coordinated
appraisal, two-way reporting and partnership
agreements (World Bank 2000: 9). Medium-term
expenditure frameworks, results-oriented budgeting
and country financial accountability assessments are
other management tools that are also used in
SWAps. All of this enhances resource planning,
expenditure control and performance management
systems that are leading to current financial
management reforms.
10 Conclusions
Peacetime has made it possible for the Mozambican
government to push forward with broad economic
and public sector reforms and public revenue and
expenditure management reforms aimed at reducing
absolute poverty, improving service delivery,
enhancing the professionalism of the public sector,
improving accountability and transparency in the
management of public affairs, promoting good
governance and community participation and
combating corruption. These changes are part of the
package of reforms aimed at achieving the
Millennium Development Goals to which
Mozambique is committed.
The crucial factors contributing to and sustaining
Mozambique’s ‘turnaround’ should now be apparent.
They include the relatively successful liberalisation of
the economy and its subsequent higher rates of
economic growth, the government’s capacity to
attract foreign investments and Mozambique’s
eligibility for the HIPC initiative. But there is more
to it than economic change. The 1992 Rome peace
agreement, the approval of the 1990 constitution,
the successful repatriation of millions of refugees
who were living in neighbouring countries and their
resettlement in Mozambique, the broad government
reconstruction programme, the holding of three
general and presidential elections, the realisation of
the 1998 and 2003 local elections all matter. So do
the productive engagement between the
government and aid donors, and the approval of the
2004 consensual constitution by the multi-party
parliament.
While much progress has been achieved in the
pursuit of reforms, Mozambique’s long-term
economic growth and PSR sustainability are,
however, threatened by the low level of education
and skills of the population. While Mozambique has
prospects for overcoming these obstacles, its
potential can only be fully realised if investments
continue to flow towards human capital training as
stimuli to socio-economic development.
Despite the impressive progress made in liberalising
the economy and foreign trade, and privatising state-
owned enterprises, Mozambique still bears the scars
of a post-conflict country, where the initial thrust of
the reconstruction activities was focused on
economic reforms to ensure macroeconomic stability
and higher rates of economic growth in preparation
for more tough processes of peace negotiations,
pacification, democratisation and other political and
economic reforms.
Mozambique’s current and future challenges relate
to the mounting allegations of increasing corruption
in government institutions, its heavy dependence on
foreign aid, the domination of political and economic
powers by elites and the corresponding weakness
and fragmentation of broad-based political
networks. It also remains vulnerable to external
interventions, the private manipulation of public
power (cronyism, corruption, rent-seeking and an
administrative morass), resistance to public sector
reforms and severe inequalities in income.
Taken together, these problems can be seen as
formidable obstacles to Mozambique’s long-term
sustained ‘turnaround’. Clearly these problems
should merit a radical focus to ensure not only the
legitimation of the state power but also for the sake
of poverty reduction and better development
programmes executed by competent, efficient,
transparent and accountable state institutions.
6
Only
a state with these features can become a
developmental democratic state, defined as one
which ‘… can simultaneously carry forward a
development project founded on growth and
equality, and which rests on democratic political
foundations’ (Robinson and White 1998: 5).
The basis for the emergence of such a state lies in
the definition of a social contract, by citizens and
leaders concerning the objectives and values that
Mozambican society wishes to pursue through the
state and the structures deemed appropriate in the
light of such objectives and values. The experience
gained in the implementation of the Decentralised
District Planning and Financing Project in Nampula
Province and of the Direct Support to Schools
Programme which evolved nationwide, as well as
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the experience of municipalisation since 1998 in 33
cities and towns – notwithstanding their recognised
weaknesses – suggest that there is scope in
Mozambique for the design of democratic
institutions which can shape both locally led
democratic governance and broad-based, sustainable
development. The institutional innovations that are
taking place in those settings are making local
institutions more legitimate, participatory,
accountable and sensitive to problems of poverty,
social welfare and equity in local settings.
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